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I. Introduction 
The UK Government and Home Office cannot be blamed for being sensible, fair, considerate 
or efficient with regard to creating and applying UK immigration policy. The Home Office has 
been rightly criticized for numerous wrongdoings, including, for example, the shockingly 
poor treatment of asylum seekers’ applications;1 the disgraceful Windrush scandal; charging 
outrageously high application fees;2 having ridiculously long waiting periods (The Home 
Office takes pride in the fact that 90% of applications for permanent residency are decided 
within 6 months);3 and generally – implementing the notorious ‘hostile environment’ policy. 
Here, however, we wish to focus on a neglected aspect of UK immigration policy: offering 
‘fast-track lanes’ for certain applications - for extra fees. We argue that this policy is morally 
indefensible – and possibly illegal. We will focus on the specific case of an application for 
Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR – or permanent residency), yet our arguments apply to 
similar cases as well and, in fact, go beyond the immigration and the UK context. The specific 
discussion here should be read within the broader context of appraising the morality and 
legality of creating fast-track public services. What is offered here is merely a starting point 
for further research on this unexplored issue. 
Within the context of UK immigration policy, the application fee for permanent residency in 
the UK for non-EU citizens is £2,389 per applicant, regardless of their age (so a family of 
three, for example, would pay £7,167). This family will have to wait for up to 6 months until 
a decision is made in their case. During these 6 months the applicants are not allowed to leave 
the UK. Should this family wishes to expedite the process, they could pay a bit extra, as 
decided by Her Majesty's Home Office: for only extra £500 per applicant, a decision would 
be made within 5 days and for as little as £800 extra per applicant, the happy family will get 
a decision within a day.4     
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1 Amelia Hill, ‘Home Office chaos and incompetence lead to unlawful detentions, claim whistle blowers’ (The 
Guardian 28 April 2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/apr/28/home-office-chaos-and-
incompetence-leads-to-unlawful-detentions-claim-whistleblowers > accessed 20/07/2020. 
2 Jamie Grierson and Sarah Marsh, ‘Slash 'obscene' Home Office fees, say MPs and campaigners’ (The Guardian 
24 June 2018).  
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/24/reduce-home-office-fees-say-mps-campaigners> 
accessed 20/07/2020. 
3 UK Visa and Immigration, About our Services <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-visas-
and-immigration/about-our-services> accessed 06/09/2020. 
4 UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Get a faster decision on your Visa or Settlement Application’ 
<https://www.gov.uk/faster-decision-visa-settlement> accessed 15/08/2020. Due to the impact of COVID-19, 
this service is currently unavailable, but based on the rest of the information available, it is reasonable that the 
latest information on the fees would be unchanged.   
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The waiting time for getting a service is part of the general quality of the service. All other 
things being equal, a faster service is normally a better one. The moral and legal question here 
is therefore whether administrative authorities should provide better services only to those 
who can afford paying for them. We submit that fast-track public services that are offered for 
extra-fees are always suspicious and only rarely justified. This is so for two reasons. First, 
offering fast-track services normally comes at the expense of those who cannot afford paying 
for them – and that alone makes them morally indefensible. Second, many fast-track state 
services are morally indefensible, precisely because they are state services, and regardless of 
whether they directly come at the expense of those who cannot afford them. Yet the 
distinction between the two cases – those where the fast-track service comes at the expense 
of others as it allows the well-off to ‘cut in line’, and those where that is not the case – still has 
moral and legal implications. 
II. Cases where Fast-Track Services Do Not Result in ‘Cutting in Line’ 
If offering fast-track state services does not come at the expense of those who cannot afford 
paying for them, then they may be justified. That would depend on various considerations: 
the nature of the service; the normal waiting time; the purpose of offering the expedited, more 
expensive service; and the cost of the expedited service. To take one example: issuing a new 
British passport costs £75.50 and the process normally takes up to 3 weeks. If a new passport 
is needed as a matter of urgency, it is possible to pay £177 for a premium, expedited service 
and to be issued a passport within 24 hours. This case does not raise any moral or legal 
difficulties. The normal waiting time is quite reasonable; the purpose of the expedited service 
is legitimate – answering cases of emergency; the cost of the expedited service is reasonable; 
the fast-track service probably does not come at the expense of those who do not need it or 
cannot afford it; and the nature of the service does not give rise to special problems.  
In the immigration context, another example that may demonstrate the distinction between 
a potentially justifiable and an unjust expediting of services, is the new Health and Care visa. 
This would create a fast-track visa route for eligible health and care professionals in order to 
enable the steady, continued flow of overseas talent into the UK to work in the NHS, for NHS 
commissioned service providers, and in eligible occupations in the social care sector.5 As well 
as reduced visa application fees and an exemption from the Immigration Health Surcharge, 
applicants would be able to expect a decision on whether they can work in the UK within just 
three weeks, following biometric enrolment. Thus, not only is the process easier and quicker, 
which is usual for a fast-track service, it is also cheaper, distinguishing this from our ILR 
example. But more importantly, the legitimacy of this proposal may be argued more strongly 
due to the purpose of offering the expedited service, that is, securing the best health and care 
professionals for the NHS as opposed to offering a different and better service based solely 
on the ability of the applicant to pay for it. As we shall see below, the case of most immigration 
applications is closer to the latter.         
III. Cases Where Fast-Track Services Do Result in ‘Cutting in Line’ 
If offering fast-track services does come at the expense of those who cannot afford paying for 
them; if fast-track services increase waiting times of those who cannot afford paying for them; 
if those who pay for fast-track services in fact ‘cut in line’, then that should be a sufficient 
reason for public authorities to not offer them. Within the immigration applications context, 
 
5 Department of Health and Social Care and Home Office, ‘Government launches Health and Care Visa to ensure 
UK health and care services have access to the best global talent’ (14 July 2020)  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-health-and-care-visa-to-ensure-uk-health-
and-care-services-have-access-to-the-best-global-talent > accessed 15/08/2020. 
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there is no evidence – and no reason to believe – that the Home Office uses the fast-track 
service fees to employ dedicated staff who will deal with these applications only. This is so 
because of the general fee policy that is applied by the home office. The fee for a non-
expedited application for an ILR is £2,389, whereas the cost to the Home Office of processing 
an ILR application is only £243.6 The waiting period is up to 6 months. The Home Office does 
not use the normal application fee to employ officers who will provide the service in a 
reasonable period of time. There is therefore no reason to believe that the extra £500-800 
paid for the expedited process are being used for covering the expenses of such a process – 
which in any event cannot exceed £243 – the cost of processing an ILR application. If this 
fast-track service is offered at the expense of those who cannot afford it, allowing wealthy 
applicants to cut in line, it has no moral-political legitimacy. 
From a moral-political perspective, and as per the social-contract device employed by Rawls,7 
i.e. the ‘original position’, it is morally indefensible to allow wealth-based discrimination such 
as that which exists in the present case. In the Rawlsian original position, people are placed 
behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ and asked to design the governing rules of society under fair 
and impartial conditions. Behind the veil of ignorance, they are free, rational and equal 
persons, with no knowledge of their external features, such as race, socioeconomic status, 
gender etc., that may otherwise affect rational judgment. The defining characteristics of these 
persons are rationality and selfishness – while being ignorant regarding the external factors 
described above.  
The subsequently arising Rawlsian conception of ‘justice as fairness’ may be applied here, and 
it can be argued that behind the hypothetical veil of ignorance, rational persons would never 
choose a policy whereby the state provides fast-track services based entirely on wealth, at the 
expense of those who cannot afford paying for the expedited service, purely because it is 
entirely possible for them to be the ones who are economically disadvantaged in that society. 
Thus, the rational and therefore moral decision would be for the state to provide this service 
without discrimination on the ground of wealth, that is, without the option of fast lanes. Even 
if a social contract theory were applied in the limited sense - only as an argument for political 
legitimacy,8 it seems reasonable to conclude that this legitimacy may come under question 
with the introduction of such unfair policies that specifically disadvantage certain members 
of society.     
IV. The Immorality of Fast-Track State Services  
Fast-track services of state services are always morally indefensible if they come at the 
expense of those who cannot afford them. Yet they may be morally indefensible even if we 
assume that offering them does not come at the expense of the service provided to those who 
cannot afford them. In our case, fast-track services within the context of immigration 
applications are indefensible even if it is assumed that the fees charged from those who pay 
for them are being used for hiring public officials who will handle these requests – and to pay 
for other special expenses - if there are any. This is so because, and subject to rare exceptions, 
the state, as a matter of principle, should not provide quicker and indeed better public 
services only to those who can afford them. Doing so would be institutional-state 
discrimination on the ground of wealth, which, regardless of its legality – is morally 
impermissible. 
 
6 UK Visas and Immigration, ‘Visa Fees Transparency Data’ (4th August 2020) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/visa-fees-transparency-data> accessed 15/08/2020.  
7 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised edn, Harvard University Press 1971) 17. 
8 Samuel Freeman, ‘Original Position’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer edn, 2019) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/original-position/> accessed 06/09/2020. 
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The moral argument made here is rooted in the idea of the fundamental obligations that the 
state owes to its subjects, including the moral duty that requires the state to treat all its 
subjects, including residents and potential permanent citizens - equally, regardless of their 
wealth or socio-economic status. In the present case, for instance, if the state were to use the 
‘premium fee’ to provide a better service, and to employ public officials dedicated solely to 
the task of catering to those who paid the premium fee, it would effectively amount to the 
state perpetuating a system of social inequality and accepting that those who can afford it 
would be treated in an entirely different and in fact superior manner. They would be placed 
in a separate class of people, not subject to the same rules as other members of society. As 
such, this practice of state discrimination runs counter to morality and justice, and arguably 
paves the way for further policies that will do the same. Due to the ‘implicit connection 
between the concept of the state and the idea of equality’9 in a democratic state, the only 
morally and politically sound policy is one that treats all citizens equally as far as public 
services are concerned. If we accept basic egalitarianism as a substantive value in modern 
political philosophy,10 it would require that the ‘government treat its citizens with equal 
consideration’.11  
A few examples can clarify the argument regarding the moral impermissibility of institutional 
state discrimination of the ground of wealth. Assume that the state creates fast-track services 
that allow those who pay higher court-fees to have their case heard quicker; or fast-track 
services that expedite the process of getting permits from the authorities; or an option to pay 
a significant sum of money for an upgraded, en-suite, private prison cell. These examples 
seem far-fetched and unthinkable (or so we hope) but they are not significantly different from 
the case of having immigration applications fast-track lanes. If we accept the moral legitimacy 
of fast-track lanes within the immigration context, accepting such lanes in the examples given 
above does not seem to require an exponential logical leap. 
It is a truism that wealthy people can generally exercise their rights more efficiently and that 
they have more valuable opportunities from which they can choose. It is also a truism that 
inequality in wealth distribution results from and results in numerous social injustices. The 
state may or may not tackle these social problems in a satisfactory way, but there is something 
uniquely troubling in creating fast-track public services for the wealthy. This is a clear, direct 
and explicit statement that is conveyed by the state, according to which ‘we will provide better 
public services – but only to those who are able to pay for them’. This is where the state openly 
admits that it does not treat its citizens as equal members of society. 
In Rawlsian terms, people might have ‘equal liberty’ but this is distinguishable from ‘worth 
of liberty’, which refers to the capacity of individuals to exercise their liberties: those who 
have greater authority and wealth have greater means to achieve their aims – also by 
exercising the rights more effectively.12 As an example, freedom of expression might be a 
liberty equally applicable to all; however, the more resources one has, the more effectively 
they might be able to exercise this freedom and to ensure their views are heard. Hence, one 
might have the right to apply for an expedited ILR application, but due to a lack of means, 
the worth of the right or the ability to exercise it, is constrained. It can then be argued, as 
some persuasively do,13 that the distinction between ‘liberty’ and ‘worth of liberty’ is arbitrary 
 
9  Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (2000) 83.  
10 Nicholas Smith, Basic Equality and Discrimination: Reconciling Theory and Law (Ashgate Publishing 2011) 
2. 
11 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (OUP 1990) 4. 
12 J Rawls (n 7) 179. 
13 Norman Daniels, ‘On Liberty and Inequality in Rawls’ (1974) 3(2) Social Theory and Practice 149. 
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and unsuccessful in reconciling liberty and equality. This is so because not being able to 
exercise a right that one has, is arguably the same as not having the right to begin with.  
A possible counterargument could be that within the context of immigration applications, 
creating fast-track lanes allows those who are in desperate need for a quicker service – to 
actually get it. This argument cannot survive scrutiny. First, it is the responsibility of the 
authorities to accommodate the extenuating circumstances of those who need a quicker 
public service. If the general policy is that applications are being decided within 6 months – 
the administrative authority is under a general duty to consider cases that may justify making 
a quicker decision. This duty must not depend on the ability of the applicant to pay for the 
expedited service. A reasonable accommodation of an urgent need may be illustrated by, for 
example, the introduction of fast-track applications to register children’s homes that are 
needed urgently to provide placements for children as a direct result of COVID-19,14 or fast-
track DBS checks as a result of the same (which, in some cases, are free of charge due to their 
emergency nature).15  
Secondly, and as was noted above – the application fee for an ILR is a staggering £2,389. The 
cost to the Home Office of processing an ILR application is £243. The moral illegitimacy of 
this extortionate fee aside, minimum decency and a shred of moral integrity would have led 
the authorities to use the nearly £2,000 profit they make out of each application in order to 
employ sufficient number of civil servants who would decide applications within a reasonable 
time-frame thus eliminating the need for a fast-track lane to begin with. Instead, the state 
wrongs non-wealthy applicants in no less than three different ways. Once, by charging the 
extortionate application fee (or shall we say – regressive ‘immigration tax’) of £2,389; twice, 
by not using these funds to decide applications within a reasonable time-frame; and third, by 
creating fast-track lanes only for those who can afford them. When we consider a host of other 
fast-track public services offered as a result of various reasons or needs, for example, 
expedited trials,16 fast track patent applications (PCT(UK) Fast Track),17 and SSSI advice,18 it 
becomes increasingly evident that there are expedited services that do not involve a direct 
impact of wealth on the provision of the service when there is no merit involved. This 
indicates not only the blatant immorality of fast-track lanes for immigration applications, but 
also points toward a lack of transparency by the state, as immigration-related policy decisions 
seem to be driven by some undisclosed reasons, unrelated to the service itself.    
V. The Illegality of Fast-Track State Services 
The ILR application fast-track lane is therefore morally indefensible. But is it also illegal? 
Within the UK context, if the ILR fast-track lane were decided by primary legislation, it would 
not have been easy to challenge its compatibility with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). It is hard to see how a statutory fast-track lane, however morally indefensible, 
is also incompatible with the ECHR or EU law. However, the ILR fast-track lane was created 
 
14 Ofsted, ‘Registering children’s homes in an emergency as a direct result of COVID-19 pandemic: fast-track 
applications’ (11th May 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/registering-childrens-homes-in-an-emergency-
as-a-direct-result-of-covid-19-pandemic-fast-track-applications> accessed 15/08/2020. 
15 Disclosure and Barring Service, ‘Free-of-charge DBS applications and fast-track Barred List check service’ 
(27th March 2020) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/covid-19-free-of-charge-dbs-applications-
and-fast-track-barred-list-check-service> accessed 15/08/2020. 
16 Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Teva UK Ltd and others [2011] EWHC 2018 (Ch) [12] 
17 Intellectual Property Office, ‘Patents: accelerated processing’ (13th June 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/guidance/patents-accelerated-processing> accessed 06/09/2020. 
18 Natural England, ‘Get fast-track advice for SSSI consent’(8th April 2020) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/get-fast-track-advice-for-sssi-consent> accessed 
06/09/2020. 
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by an administrative body. As a result, challenging its legality becomes easier. Within the 
immigration context, fast-track lanes (both their existence and the fees paid) were not created 
by primary legislation but by the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Regulations19. As such, 
they are exposed to a legal challenge – if a suitable ground of judicial review is found.  
Even though immigration applications fast-track lanes discriminate on the ground of wealth 
(or social status) - wealth or social status are not protected characteristics under the Equality 
Act 2010. Furthermore, in UK administrative law, there is no general duty to not discriminate 
or to act fairly. Equality law, therefore, cannot help much here. But reasonableness review 
can. The duty to act reasonably imposes a duty on administrative bodies to accord proper 
weight to the relevant considerations.20 In our case, the Home Office should accord proper 
weight to the reasons for creating these fast-track lanes – and to the reasons against it – and 
to properly balance these reasons. It is hard to know what the reasons for having ILR fast-
track lanes are. They are not meant to solve emergency-related problems – or to 
accommodate extenuating circumstances, because, unlike other expedited services where 
some justification is required, the only prerequisite for the provision of a faster service is 
payment of the premium amount. The fast-track service merely offers more convenience and 
a better service for wealthy applicants. It appears that the main purpose of these fast-track 
lanes is to create a source of income for the Home Office by offering a premium service to 
those who can afford it.  
Even if the argument is made that the extortionate initial fees have a legitimate reason 
(achievement of self-funding for immigration services rather than taxpayers’ contribution,21 
which itself is questionable because of the significantly lower processing cost), there is no 
reason at all for creating the expedited service, except for creating a source of income for the 
state. It is highly doubtful whether this is a legitimate purpose the Home Office is allowed to 
pursue – but let us assume that it is. The reasons against having these fast-track lanes, 
especially when they come at the expense of those who cannot afford paying for them, were 
mentioned above and they outweigh the reasons for having them: fast-track lanes 
discriminate against those who cannot afford paying for them – treating them as non-equal 
members of society; they come at the expense of those who cannot afford them – as those 
who pay for the expedited process in fact ‘cut in line’; they result in loss of trust in the state; 
and they violate the social contract between the state and its subjects.  
It is not at all clear whether these reasons against offering the expedited service were 
considered by the Home Office. It might be the case that the administrative body in question 
has neglected to take into account these considerations – and that would be one possible 
ground of illegality. But even if these considerations were taken into account, it is evident that 
they were not accorded proper weight, leading to a decision that does not only reflect a 
distorted balance of the relevant considerations but also one that is ‘outrageous in its defiance 
of…acceptable moral standards’22 as discussed above. The decision to have fast-track lanes 
 
19 Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/330. 
20 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Venables and Thompson [1997] 3 WLR 23; 
Paul P Craig, ‘The Nature of Reasonableness Review’ (2013) 66 Current Legal Problems 131; Yossi Nehushtan, 
‘The Non-Identical Twins in UK Public Law: Reasonableness and Proportionality’ (2017) 50(1) Israel Law 
Review 69. 
21 David Bolt, An inspection of the policies and practices of the Home Office’s Borders, Immigration and 
Citizenship Systems relating to charging and fees (2019) 7 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/79268
2/An_inspection_of_the_policies_and_practices_of_the_Home_Office_s_Borders__Immigration_and_Cit
izenship_Systems_relating_to_charging_and_fees.pdf> accessed 29/08/20. 
22 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410; Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223, 230. 
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for immigration applications is therefore unreasonable and possibly illegal. These fast-track 
lanes are not much less outrageous – or legally unreasonable – than fast-track lanes that 
would allow those who pay higher court-fees to have their case heard quicker – or offering 
the option to pay a significant sum of money for an upgraded, en-suite, private prison cell.  
Introducing fast-track lanes is, by far, not the most troubling problem regarding UK 
immigration laws and policies. This is, however, a problem that is easy to fix. Failure to do so 
would be morally indefensible and potentially illegal. 
 
 
